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Abstract 
The EPA will issue rules regulating greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from existing steam boilers 
and refineries in 2012. A crucial issue affecting the scope and cost of emissions reductions will be the 
potential introduction of flexibility in compliance, including averaging across groups of facilities. This 
research investigates the role of compliance flexibility for the most important of these source categories—
existing coal-fired power plants—that currently account for one-third of national emissions of carbon 
dioxide, the most important greenhouse gas. We find a flexible standard, calibrated to achieve the same 
emissions reductions as an inflexible approach, reduces the increase in electricity price by 60 percent and 
overall costs by two-thirds in 2020. The flexible standard also leads to substantially more investment to 
improve the operating efficiency of existing facilities, whereas the inflexible standard leads to 
substantially greater retirement of existing facilities. 
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Retail Electricity Price Savings from Compliance Flexibility in GHG 
Standards for Stationary Sources 
Dallas Burtraw, Anthony Paul, and Matt Woerman 
1  Introduction 
The direction of climate policy in the U.S. has changed course with the failure of 
legislative proposals and the recent court decision (Massachusetts v. EPA) confirming the 
authority of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to regulate GHG emissions under the 
Clean Air Act (CAA). Regulation will unfold in three major venues. In January 2011 the EPA 
issued new vehicle fuel efficiency standards (“Corporate Average Fuel Efficiency”) affecting 
model-year 2012 vehicles, with standards tightening over time. Secondly, the agency put in place 
GHG permitting procedures (“New Source Review”) affecting major new sources and major 
modifications at existing sources. Third, the EPA will develop a regulatory framework to 
regulate existing stationary sources with performance standards analogous to those applying to 
new sources. That framework will provide guidelines to states for the development of plans that 
will be implemented by the states. The first of these standards will regulate the performance of 
steam boilers and refineries at new and existing facilities, with draft rules expected in September 
2011 and final rules expected in March 2012.  
The third category—regulation of existing stationary sources—is likely to be the most 
important and within this category the regulation of electricity generation is key. Electricity 
generation causes 33 percent of U.S. greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions including 40 percent of 
carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. More importantly the electricity sector is expected to account 
for two-thirds to three-quarters of economy-wide emissions reductions under a cost-effective 
implementation of greenhouse gas policy (EIA 2009a; EPA 2009). Consequently the 
introduction of policy to reduce GHGs emissions could have important effects on the electricity 
sector. Most affected will be the operation of coal-fired power plants, which account for 82.5 
percent of electricity sector emissions, or 33.3 percent of total US emissions (EIA 2009a). 
This research investigates alternatives for regulation of existing coal-fired power plants 
and the potential magnitude of emissions reductions from these plants, and compares these 
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options with recent legislative proposals. In particular, we examine the effect on costs from 
introducing flexibility in compliance. Two regulatory approaches that might emerge under the 
CAA would impose energy efficiency-based or emission rate-based performance standards for 
new and existing power plants (Richardson, Fraas, and Burtraw 2011).1 One variation could 
adopt strict, inflexible performance standards, and a second could allow compliance flexibility 
such that standards might not necessarily be achieved at an individual facility, but would be 
achieved on average. Either of these approaches would target technological performance but 
would not explicitly cap emissions. Two other approaches involve cap and trade. One would 
initially distribute emissions allowances through a revenue-raising auction.2 The second would 
distribute emissions allowances for free to local distribution companies (LDCs).3 The cost 
increase is closely tied to the level of effort (stringency) required by the policy. To facilitate a 
comparison of their cost effectiveness these various policies are calibrated to achieve equivalent 
emissions reductions of 5.4 percent (141 million short tons) from baseline in 2020.  
To model these policies we employ a highly parameterized regional, intertemporal 
economic model of investment and operation of the U.S. electricity system. Our primary 
indicator of the regulatory impact on the electricity sector is the change in retail electricity prices. 
We also evaluate several other outcome measures including changes in investment and the 
operating efficiency of existing plants.  
                                                 
1 The distinction between these measures is subtle. Because the carbon content of fossil fuel varies little within each 
fuel type (coal, gas, oil) there is almost a one-to-one mapping between these measures for fossil-fired power plants 
that have no post-combustion controls for greenhouse gases. As an example, combustion of Powder River Basin 
low-sulfur subbituminous coal emits 212.7 lb CO2 per MMBtu of heat content, or 2.127*10
-4 lb CO2/Btu. The 
product of this rate and the plant’s heat rate gives the emission rate of the plant. For example, a plant with a heat rate 
of 10,000 Btu/kWh has a CO2 emission rate of 2.127 lb CO2/kWh (2.127*10
-4 * 10,000). However, if a plant was to 
co-fire with biomass, then its energy efficiency measured by its “heat rate” (Btu/kwh) could go up, implying worse 
performance, while its emissions rate (CO2e/kwh) might go down (depending on emissions assigned to biomass), 
implying better performance. The same disparity could emerge with the installation of post-combustion carbon 
capture technology. Consequently an emissions rate standard would be preferable as a regulatory approach but in 
this paper it is roughly equivalent to a heat rate standard because we do not allow for retrofit of CCS at existing 
facilities. In sensitivity analysis we allow for biomass cofiring to count toward compliance with the heat rate 
standard.  
2 Under the Clean Air Act a federal auction of allowances by the Environmental Protection Agency could not occur, 
and the breadth of the trading program would be restricted. States would play a large role in implementation and 
enforcement under the Clean Air Act, and if trading were permissible states conceivably could auction allowances. 
3 Both of these approaches were embodied to varying degrees in recently proposed federal legislation, and are 
embodied in California’s cap and trade program that is slated to begin in 2012. The auction approach is the 
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In brief, we find the flexible standard results in an increase of 1.3 percent in electricity 
prices. This compares to an increase of 3.3 percent under an inflexible standard. We find the 
overall costs of a flexible standard including the costs on firms are just one-third that of an 
inflexible standard. We also find that a flexible approach leads to substantially greater 
investment to improve the efficiency of existing facilities, while an inflexible standard leads to 
substantially greater retirement of existing facilities than does a flexible approach. 
The change in electricity prices is likely to vary by region of the country because regions 
vary in the quantity of electricity consumption and the type of fuel and technology used for 
electricity generation. Moreover many regions rely heavily on electricity generated in other 
states or regions of the country, at least during certain seasons or times of day, and the fuel and 
technology used for electricity generation varies across time. For these reasons the change in 
electricity price by region may not depend entirely on the emissions intensity of generation in 
that region. 
2  Scenarios and Approach 
As described above, we define four policy cases with equal emissions reductions. 
However, the implementation of technology performance standards under the Clean Air Act is 
not expected to specify an emissions cap. Therefore, to establish equivalency we solve the 
regulatory policies first to obtain emissions reductions in 2020, and that outcome is introduced 
directly as an emissions cap in the other two policies. These reductions are compared to a 
business-as-usual baseline that is built on fuel price forecasts contained in the EIA’s Annual 
Energy Outlook for 2011. 4 The four policy approaches to be evaluated are summarized in Table 
1 and described below. 
2.1  Flexible Performance Standard for Coal-Fired Plants 
The flexible policy is designed to achieve a 5 percent improvement from the observed 
2010 average operating efficiency of coal-fired power plants by 2020. By 2020, this translates 
into a 5.2 percent improvement due to a decline in efficiency across the fleet in the baseline 
between 2010 and 2020, in part due to increasing utilization of less efficient plants to meet 
growing demand. The efficiency of a plant is measured by its heat rate, which represents the 
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quantity of fuel (Btu) needed to produce a unit of electricity (kWh). A percentage improvement 
in heat rate is nearly equivalent to an equal percentage improvement in the emissions rate in 
terms of the change in emissions of CO2. The difference stems from slight variation in carbon 
per Btu in varieties of coals. Nonetheless in practice an emissions rate standard would provide 
incentives for this opportunity for emissions reductions and would be preferable, but it is not 
modeled here. The performance standard is phased in linearly beginning in 2012 and fully 
implemented in 2020. Improvement in average heat rate can be achieved either through 
improvements in the operating efficiency at plants not meeting the standard, improvements at 
plants that already meet the standard, or reduced utilization of relatively inefficient plants.  
 
Table 1. Scenario Decriptions 
(2020 data)  Baseline 
Demand   Calibrated to AEO 2010 
Fuel supply and prices  Functions calibrated to AEO 2011 
Initial generation capacity   Calibrated to 2008 plant data 
Environmental regulations
1   CAIR 
Electricity Price ($/MWh)  86.91 
Heat Rate at Coal Facilities (Btu/kWh)  10,182 
Efficiency Investments (M$)  189 
Cost of Coal ($/MMBtu)  1.96 
Cost of Gas ($/MMBtu)  5.35 
CO2 Emissions (Mtons)  2,631 
  Flexible 
Compliance  Inflexible Standard  Cap and Trade 
(LDC) 
Cap and Trade 
(auction) 
Policy  Tradable 
performance 
standard 
Inflexible heat rate 
performance 
standard 
Emissions cap and 
trade with free 
allocation to local 
distribution 
companies 
Emissions cap and 
trade with auction 
Policy target
2  5% improvement in 
heat rate at coal-
fired plants (9,657 
Btu/kWh) by 2020. 
Requirement phased 
in linearly beginning 
2012. 
Maximum heat rate 
10,300 (Btu/kWh) 
by 2020 phased in 
beginning 2012.  
Cap phased in 
beginning 2012.  
Cap phased in 
beginning 2012.  
CO2 reductions   141 million tons   141 million tons  141 million tons   141 million tons  
1) The Cross-State Air Pollution Rule and Utility MACT are not included. 
2) Policy targets are calibrated to achieve emissions reductions comparable to the Flexible Compliance Policy. Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Paul, and Woerman 
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We label the mechanism for transferring credit for generation at relatively efficient plants 
to relatively inefficient plants as a generation efficiency credit offset (GECO), which is 
denominated as Btu/kWh. Plants that are efficient relative to the benchmark (Btu/kWh) earn 
transferable credits on net, and plants that are relatively inefficient need to obtain such credits. In 
the simulation model below the benchmark is set at 9,657 Btu/kWh. The credits have a monetary 
value ($) and are earned (and surrendered) on every kWh of production. Consequently the 
GECO price is denominated in $/(Btu/kWh)/kWh = $/Btu. We calculate a national equilibrium 
price for GECOs within the electricity market model. 
Although the standard may lead to some fuel switching from coal to natural gas or other 
technologies, it is not designed to encourage that. Since the standard is specified in terms of plant 
efficiency, rather than an emissions cap, only improvements in plant  operating efficiency and 
greater utilization of relatively efficient coal plants receive credit toward compliance. There is no 
credit given for retirement of plants, greater use of natural gas or biomass or natural gas cofiring. 
The emission reduction that is achieved across the sector, accounting for changes in utilization of 
all technologies, provides the emissions reduction target of 5.4 percent that is used in the other 
scenarios. 
2.2  Inflexible Performance Standard for Coal-Fired Plants 
The inflexible performance standard is constructed around technological opportunities to 
achieve improvements in the operating efficiency of coal-fired power plants. Plants with 
operating efficiency that does not meet the standard would either have to retire or make 
improvements in operating efficiency to come into compliance. The inflexible standard could 
lead to some substitution away from coal, but it is not designed to encourage that. The inflexible 
standard is solved repeatedly to find a heat rate standard that achieves total emissions reductions 
for the sector equal to the emissions target. 
2.3   Cap and Trade with Auctioned Emissions Allowances 
The cap-and-trade approach allows full flexibility in how the industry responds to the 
introduction of a price on CO2. In principle, a trading program may allow for temporal flexibility 
through banking (and potentially borrowing) of emissions allowances. However, to facilitate 
comparison across the four scenarios we do not allow for emissions banking, so emissions caps 
are set equal to emissions outcomes in every year under the performance standard. 
An auction of emissions allowances would yield substantial revenue that must be 
accounted for. We assume the auction revenue displaces the need for other sources of revenue Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Paul, and Woerman 
6 
and value it on a dollar per dollar basis.5 To facilitate comparison across policy approaches we 
report the auction revenue per kWh of consumption. 
2.4   Cap and Trade with Free Allocation to Local Distribution Companies 
Allowances distributed to LDCs would be sold or auctioned to entities with a compliance 
responsibility. The sale of allowances would provide a revenue stream that could be used to 
offset much of the increase in costs that is expected in the wholesale power market as a result of 
the cap and trade program. Since LDCs are regulated, they can be expected to pass the benefits 
of the free allocation on to customers in one way or another, leading to smaller changes in retail 
electricity prices than would cap and trade with an auction.  
There are several issues that surface in the design of free allocation to LDCs. The formula 
by which allowance value is apportioned to LDCs could depend on relative population, 
consumption or the emissions intensity of consumption. We use a weighted average based 
equally on the historic emissions intensity of consumption and an updated measure of relative 
consumption by each LDC aggregated at the 21 regions in the model. This is roughly equivalent 
to the approach embodied in the Waxman-Markey legislation (HR 2454). 
At the LDC level, another important decision is how allowance value is distributed across 
the residential, industrial and commercial customer classes. We distribute the value such that 
each class receives a share proportional to its level of consumption in the baseline. Moreover, the 
way value is returned could have a substantial impact on the results. If value were used to offset 
variable costs, and if customers perceive variable costs distinct from average electricity prices, 
then the allocation to LDCs could have a potent effect in leading to more electricity 
consumption. If consumers do not differentiate variable costs from average price then it would 
have a modest effect, since average price would change by less than variable costs. Instead, if the 
value were used to offset fixed costs associated with transmission, distribution and billing costs, 
and if customers perceive variable costs distinct from average electricity prices, then customers 
would perceive that variable electricity prices increase in a way comparable to the auction 
scenario and a greater reduction in electricity demand would result. However, evidence suggests 
that residential class customers would not distinguish the variable cost change from the change in 
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the average price (Ito 2010; Borenstein 2009). On the other hand commercial and industrial class 
customers may be able to distinguish this difference.  
In order to illustrate the differences in the policy approaches as clearly as possible, we 
model LDC allocation as reducing variable costs for all customers. This means that all customers 
would see lower electricity prices than under an auction and greater consumption would be 
expected as a result, which will raise the price of tradable emissions allowances compared to the 
auction (Paul, Burtraw, and Palmer 2010; Burtraw, Walls, and Blonz 2010). 
3   Background 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA confirmed the authority of 
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to regulate GHGs under the Clean Air Act (CAA). 
In response the EPA initiated a scientific inquiry and subsequently made a finding of 
“endangerment” establishing the threat of GHG emissions to human health and the environment, 
which subsequently compels the EPA to mitigate that harm. The first regulation attempting to do 
so is the revised fuel efficiency standard for cars and trucks and construction permitting 
mentioned previously. Next the EPA will regulate stationary sources. Among several regulatory 
options for stationary sources the EPA has committed to promulgating performance standards 
under §111(b) for new sources (these are termed New Source Performance Standards, or NSPS), 
and under §111(d) for existing sources. These are technology based standards, but there exists 
significant opportunity for the flexibility in achieving compliance with the standards, including 
tradable performance standards that could allow averaging of emissions rates across sources to 
achieve emissions reductions in a cost effective manner (Burtraw, Fraas, and Richardson 2011; 
Monast, Profeta, and Cooley 2010; Mullins and Enion 2010; Richardson, Fraas, and Burtraw 
2011). Two important questions are the magnitude of reductions that might be achieved and the 
potential cost savings and other impacts that might result from flexible compliance.  
The EPA’s advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPR) EPA (2008a) provides 
information about the first of these questions—the potential magnitude of emissions reductions 
at various facilities including most importantly at coal-fired power plants.6 These plants are able 
to reduce CO2 emissions by upgrading and modifying various plant systems, which would 
improve plant efficiency. The ANPR notes that heat rate reductions of up to 10 percent may be 
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possible at some individual units. Over the entire fleet, however, the average heat rate reduction 
could reasonably be expected to be 2 to 5 percent. A reduction in heat rate translates directly into 
a reduction in CO2 emissions per unit of electricity generation. The current fleet-wide average 
heat rate is about 10,300 Btu/kWh, and ranges from below 9,000 to above 15,000 Btu/kWh (EPA 
2008b). 
Additionally, as older coal-fired power plants are retired, new and more efficient coal-
fired plants may replace that capacity. A new supercritical coal-fired power plant is designed to 
operate at a heat rate about 8,500 Btu/kWh, an 18 percent improvement over the current fleet-
wide average (EPA 2008b). Future ultra-supercritical plants may achieve a heat rate reduction of 
23 percent over the current average. As these new plants are built, they will be included in fleet-
wide calculations, and thus will have a bearing on future revised standards for existing coal-fired 
power plants.7 
EPA (2008b) also notes the potential role of co-firing biomass, which subject to physical, 
operational, and biomass-supply constraints, could replace up to 10 percent of the heat input 
from coal without substantial modifications to existing plants. Regional and seasonal constraints 
on biomass availability further restrict the ability to co-fire biomass, leading to the conclusion 
that 2 to 5 percent of coal use may be substituted with biomass. If one views biomass supply as 
roughly carbon neutral, this would reduce CO2 emissions by 2 to 5 percent.8 
DiPietro and Krulla (2010) address the opportunity to improve average operating 
efficiency by studying the current distribution of plants and conclude that heat rates could 
reasonably increase from their estimate of the current level of about 10,498 to 9,477.9 They find 
plants in the top performing decile in 2008 had an average heat rate of efficiency of 9,074, while 
the bottom decile had an average heat rate of 12,362. Plants in the top decile are typically larger, 
have higher steam pressures, and burn a higher percentage of bituminous coal; nonetheless some 
                                                 
7 For example, if a standard was based on the heat rate of the 90
th percentile plant, then new plants might decrease 
the heat rate of the 90
th percentile plant and consequently decrease the heat rate required by the standard. 
8 This volume of biomass is roughly comparable to waste agriculture and forestry products. At this scale biomass 
cofiring would introduce much less competition for resources than would closed-loop dedicated biomass generation. 
9 The authors discuss the operating efficiency of plants, which we convert to heat rate. One kWh of electricity 
contains 3,412 Btu of energy. A coal plant that perfectly converted the heat content of coal into electricity, and thus 
had an operating efficiency of 100%, would have a heat rate of 3,412 Btu/kWh. As the operating efficieny of the 
plant falls from this level the heat rate increases. Converting from operating efficiency to heat rate is done by 
dividing 3,412 Btu/kWh by the operating efficiency. For example, a plant with an operating efficiency of 32.5% has 
a heat rate of 10,498 Btu/kWh (3,412/0.325). Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Paul, and Woerman 
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top-decile plants have capacities and steam pressures that are less than the fleet-wide average. 
Also, the average plant age and capacity factor in the top decile are approximately equal to the 
fleet-wide averages. Thus, although some quasi-fixed factors greatly influence plant efficiency, 
most plants still have the ability to improve net efficiency despite existing technical 
characteristics. At 2008 generation levels, the emissions reductions from improving average heat 
rate to 9,477 would total 175 million metric tons annually. 
Bianco and Litz (2010) consider such technology options in the context of three levels of 
ambition for performance standard regulations. In their “lackluster” scenario, existing coal-fired 
plants are required to reduce heat rates by 5 percent, as described in the EPA’s ANPR; new coal 
plants are required to meet the emission rate of a natural-gas-fired unit, which the authors state 
could be achieved by natural gas cofiring, carbon capture and storage, co-firing coal with 
biomass or utilizing waste heat. In the “middle-of-the-road” scenario, existing coal plants are 
required to reduce heat rates by 7.1 percent from 10,498 to 9,693; new coal plants are required to 
meet an emissions standard equivalent to a coal plant with 90 percent carbon capture and storage. 
In both these scenarios, the regulation of new sources would not have a near-term effect since 
they project no additional coal plants will be built before 2025.  
Their “go-getter” scenario would introduce a cap-and-trade program covering all plants 
with the cap level set equal to the reductions that would be achieved in the power sector under 
the Waxman-Markey proposal although the authors note these reductions would likely be 
delayed by approximately four years if they are to be accomplished through NSPS rather than 
legislation. According to EIA modeling of the proposal (EIA 2009), the power sector would 
reduce emissions 8.5 percent below 2012 levels in 2020 and 52 percent below 2012 levels in 
2030. It is important to note these reductions are for the entire electric power sector. The 
reduction in emissions intensity at coal plants would likely be less than these values, and many 
reductions would be achieved by shifting away from coal-fired power.  
NETL (2010) identifies 50 opportunities for implementation of efficiency improvements 
at coal-fired power plants, many of which are available to most of the fleet, as well as many 
barriers to achieving these improvements. These opportunities include training and incentives for 
workers, turbine upgrades and major boiler retrofits. Barriers include the difficulty in measuring 
coal plant efficiency in real time. Another is the lack of a financial incentive to improve 
efficiency, since regulated utilities can pass through fuel costs to consumers and lower operation 
and maintenance (O&M) costs are typically preferred to efficiency gains. Further, there can be 
uncertainty associated with efficiency improvements, including the downtime and lost revenue Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Paul, and Woerman 
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required to make the plant system upgrades and risk of the upgrade triggering construction 
permitting requirements under New Source Review. 
Sargent & Lundy (2009) provide a more in-depth examination of a set of specific 
technologies that could improve efficiency at coal-fired power plants. A representation of these 
technologies and their associated costs are included in our modeling: 
   Economizer to transfer more heat from exhaust gases to boiler feedwater, 
   Neural network to more accurately predict and optimize power plant performance, 
   Intelligent sootblowers to remove ash buildups that reduce heat transfer, 
   Air heater and duct leakage control to reduce air leakage at heat exchangers, 
   Acid dew point control to extract more heat from flue gas without corroding the air 
heater, 
   Turbine overhaul to improve turbine efficiency through design and materials used, 
   Condenser cleaning to lower the steam condensing temperature and improve turbine 
efficiency, 
   Boiler feed pump to reduce auxiliary power usage, 
   Induced draft axial fan and motor to maintain proper flue gas flow, and 
   Variable-frequency drives to improve fan motor control. 
In an average 500 MW coal plant, air heater and duct leakage control could produce a 
heat rate improvement of 10-40 Btu/kWh; at the high end turbine overhaul could produce 
potential improvement of 100-300 Btu/kWh. All of these technologies, except condenser 
cleaning (which only requires fixed O&M costs), require capital costs to install or upgrade the 
plant systems ranging from $0.5 million for intelligent sootblowers to $4-20 million for turbine 
overhaul. Many of the technologies also have fixed O&M costs that range annually from $30,000 
for variable-frequency drives to $100,000 for the economizer. Assuming a capital charge rate of 
10 percent, these costs result in average efficiency costs of $0.28-$38.65/MMBtu of heat input 
reduced, or $0.02/MWh to $0.65/MWh of electricity generated.10 Although this is a wide range 
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of costs, it illustrates that some low-cost efficiency improvements may be available for an 
average coal-fired power plant, and that more effective, but higher cost, measures also may be 
available. 
Performance standards requiring the implementation of these measures may be effective 
but they may not be the least-cost option to achieve emissions reductions. Tietenberg (1990) lists 
ten empirical studies that examined the cost of command-and-control regulation for air pollution 
control compared to the theoretical least-cost option to achieve the same level of emissions, 
including many different air pollutants and geographic areas across the United States. These 
studies find that the command-and-control policies range in cost from 1.07 to 22.0 times that of 
the least-cost policy option. Harrington, Morgenstern, and Nelson (2000) retrospectively 
evaluate the performance of flexible market-based approaches and find that expected costs 
savings compared to command and control regulation have usually met or exceeded 
expectations.  
Stavins and Newell (2003) further analyze the cost difference between the theoretical cost 
minimum, which is achieved through the use of a market-based policy instrument, and traditional 
command-and-control approaches represented by a uniform emission rate standard and a uniform 
percentage reduction standard. They examine how heterogeneous emitters affect total abatement 
costs by considering heterogeneity in the baseline emission intensity and the slope of the 
marginal abatement cost curve. They find that greater heterogeneity in either of these sources 
increases the cost savings potential of a market-based policy, and also that the level of reductions 
amplifies the cost savings due to heterogeneity. However, they also mention several reasons why 
a market-based policy may not achieve the theoretical cost minimum and may be less cost-
effective than traditional command-and-control regulations including administrative, 
transactions, and political costs, possible strategic behavior under a market-based policy, and 
systematic over-control under some command-and control regulations. 
4  Model 
The scenarios are examined using RFF’s Haiku electricity market model, which solves 
for investment and operation of the electricity system over a twenty-five year horizon in 21 
linked regions in the continental U.S. (Paul, Burtraw, and Palmer 2009). Each simulation year is 
represented by three seasons (spring and fall are combined) and four times of day, with price 
responsive demand functions for residential, commercial and industrial customer classes. Supply 
is represented using 55 model plants in each region that aggregate capacity according to 
technology and fuel source from the complete set of commercial electricity generation plants in Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Paul, and Woerman 
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the country. Coal model plants have a range of capacity at various heat rates, representing the 
range of average heat rates at the underlying constituent plants, which is extrapolated slightly 
subject to some boundary constraints. 
Operation of the electricity system (generator dispatch) in the model is based on the 
minimization of short-run variable costs of generation and a reserve margin is enforced based on 
margins obtained by EIA in the AEO 2010. Fuel prices are benchmarked to the forecasts of the 
AEO 2011 for both level and supply elasticity. Coal is differentiated along several dimensions, 
including fuel quality and content and location of supply, and both coal and natural gas prices are 
differentiated by point of delivery. The price of biomass fuel also varies by region depending on 
the mix of biomass types available and delivery costs. All of these fuels are modeled with price-
responsive supply curves. Prices for nuclear fuel and oil as well as the price of capital and labor 
are held constant. 
Investment in new generation capacity and the retirement of existing facilities are 
determined endogenously for an intertemporally consistent (forward looking) equilibrium, based 
on the capacity-related costs of providing service in the present and into the future (going-
forward costs) and the discounted value of going-forward revenue streams. Discounting for new 
capacity investments is based on an assumed real cost of capital of 8 percent. Investment and 
operation include pollution control decisions to comply with regulatory constraints for sulfur 
dioxide, nitrogen oxides and mercury, including equilibria in emissions markets.11 All currently 
available technologies are represented in the model as well as integrated gasification combined 
cycle plants with carbon capture and storage. Ultra-supercritical pulverized coal plants and 
carbon capture and storage retrofits at existing facilities are not available in the model. 
Price formation is determined by cost-of-service regulation or by competition in different 
regions corresponding to current regulatory practice. Electricity markets are assumed to maintain 
their current regulatory status throughout the modeling horizon; that is, regions that have already 
moved to competitive pricing continue that practice, and those that have not made that move 
remain regulated.12 The retail price of electricity does not vary by time of day in any region, 
though all customers in competitive regions face prices that vary from season to season. 
                                                 
11 As noted previously, the Cross State Pollution Rule and the Utility Air Toxics Rule (MACT) are not included.  
12 There is currently little momentum in any part of the country for electricity market regulatory restructuring. Some 
of the regions that have already implemented competitive markets are considering reregulating, and those that never 
instituted these markets are no longer considering doing so. Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Paul, and Woerman 
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The model includes a representation of opportunities to improve the operating efficiency 
of existing coal-fired power plants. The schedule is derived from information contained in EPA 
(2008b) and a recent engineering report from Sargent & Lundy (2009). We lack data about the 
degree to which these opportunities have already been implemented by plants. Therefore we 
have to make assumptions about the opportunities available to plants based on their observed 
heat rates. We order these measures by their average cost and fit a line to estimate a schedule of 
opportunities representing a supply curve for energy efficiency measures at existing plants. The 
full schedule encompasses heat rate improvements of approximately 700 Btu/kWh13 at an annual 
cost (capital and O&M) ranging from zero to approximately $35/MW per Btu/kWh 
improvement. We assume this supply curve represents engineering knowledge in 2008, and we 
grow the supply curve at 1 percent per year at the extensive margin, meaning that 1 percent of 
additional measures are available each year at increasing cost relative to the supply curve (i.e. the 
supply curve is made longer) ultimately yielding opportunities for 788.8 Btu/kWh in 2020.14  
For each model plant we assume that observed heat rates are inversely related to 
installation of identified measures; i.e. less efficient plants start further down the supply curve 
and have more options available to them. The benefits of efficiency improvements include 
decreased costs for fuel and pollution permits, efficiency credits in the case of a flexible 
program, and potentially greater revenue if equilibrium electricity prices are affected (this 
outcome differs in competitive and cost-of-service regions). The opportunities and costs of an 
investment differ for every MW of capacity within a model plant according to its existing heat 
rate. We anchor the supply curve assuming any MW of capacity with heat rate greater than 
11,500 Btu/kWh has all options available. The most efficient MW of capacity across the fleet has 
no options available, and the schedule is linear between these values. The choice of 11,500 as an 
anchor was made through repeated simulations that were evaluated to balance investments 
chosen in the model in the baseline and retirement that occurs under an inflexible standard. For 
example, capacity with a heat rate greater than 11,500 plus 788.8 (the maximum possible 
improvement in 2020) are necessarily forced to retire under an inflexible standard set at 11,500 
Btu/kWh in 2020. In the baseline, we see $86 million of investment in energy efficiency 
                                                 
13 The amount of heat rate improvements available and the slope of the supply curve vary depending on the size of 
the plant, but these are approximate midrange values. 
14 Also note the model assumes costs along the supply curve fall at 0.05% per year. (The supply curve slope is 
reduced.)  Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Paul, and Woerman 
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measures in 2010 under this specification. Richardson et al. (2011) and NETL (2011) suggest 
reasons why potential cost savings are left unrealized in the baseline. 
The model allows for biomass cofiring at coal plants, which is observed in the baseline. 
Cofiring does not contribute to the calculation of heat rate improvements in our main analysis, 
although in the cap and trade scenarios we observe some increase in the use of biomass as a 
response to incentives provided by the allowance price. In a sensitivity analysis we consider the 
potential role for biomass cofiring as a way to reduce costs. 
5  Analysis 
To facilitate comparison each policy is calibrated to achieve comparable reductions in 
emissions. Recall the flexible and inflexible standards are phased in linearly beginning in 2012 
and they are fully phased in by 2020. The results for 2020 are reported in Table 2. 
5.1  Electricity Prices 
In 2020 the greatest change in electricity price occurs under an inflexible standard 
($2.84/Mwh or 3.3 percent) and it is 85 percent greater than the change that would result under a 
cap-and-trade with an auction and 245 percent greater than under a flexible approach. The price 
change under the flexible approach, compared to the national average baseline level of 
$86.91/MWh, is $1.16 (1.3 percent). The cap and trade with auction has a greater effect on 
electricity price because of the allowance purchase requirements. In contrast, the cap and trade 
approach with allocation to LDCs yields no increase (in fact a slight decrease) in electricity 
prices. This outcome occurs because the vast majority of price changes under cap and trade result 
from the introduction of a price on emissions allowances but under LDC allocation, the increase 
in the cost of production is offset from the allowance price is offset by the allocation of 
allowance value to LDCs.15  
The regional-level changes in electricity prices are reported in Table 3. Under the flexible 
standard the largest change from baseline occurs in the Plains region and in the Rockies and the 
West, while expected prices fall in other regions of the country. In contrast, under the inflexible 
standard prices rise everywhere except the Southeast. That region has the smallest percentage of 
                                                 
15 Several authors have noted that electricity prices could actually fall slightly because prices are affected by the mix 
of technologies and fuels that determine the marginal cost of production, and that mix is affected by the introduction 
of a cost on CO2 emissions under cap and trade (see for example Paul et al. 2010). Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Paul, and Woerman 
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coal retirement and consequently builds the least new natural gas capacity. In addition, the power 
exports from the region increase, which provide revenue to the rate base. Since this is a regulated 
cost-of-service region, that revenue helps to offset increases in electricity price that otherwise 
might occur. Comparison of these two policies indicates a lower price in every region except the 
Plains under the flexible standard. 
We also decompose the regions according to market structure. The regulated cost-of-
service regions see virtually no change in electricity price between the flexible and inflexible 
standards; however the competitive regions see a big difference. The price change under the 
inflexible standard is $4.61/MWh (4.3 percent) but it is almost zero under the flexible standard. 
This illustrates that in the cost-of-service regions the financial transfers between relatively 
inefficient and efficient facilities about nets out in its influence on electricity price.  
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Table 2. Comparison of Scenarios Achieving Equal Reductions in CO2
1 
Year 2020  










Change in Elec. Price ($/MWh)  1.16  2.84  -0.25  1.54 
  1.3%  3.3%  -0.3%  1.8% 
Change in Generation
2 (BkWh)  -40  -74  -7  -49 
  -0.9%  -1.7%  -0.2%  -1.1% 
Coal   -114  -209  -32  -42 
  -5.9%  -10.9%  -1.7%  -2.2% 
Gas   79  132  37  5 
  7.8%  13.1%  3.7%  0.5% 
Change in Capacity
2(GW)  -0.6  -3.2  7.4  -3.3 
  -0.1%  -0.3%  0.7%  -0.3% 
Coal  -5.5  -32.6  -3.2  -4.1 
  -2.0%  -11.9%  -1.2%  -1.5% 
Gas  6.2  29.7  10.7  0.9 
  1.5%  7.0%  2.5%  0.2% 
Avg. Coal Plant Heat Rate (Btu/kWh)  9,657  9,914  10,149  10,160 
Avg. Effic. Improve. (Btu/kWh)  525  268  33  22 
  5.2%  2.6%  0.3%  0.2% 
Efficiency Investments (M$)
3  2,933  349  117  92 
GECO Price ($/MMBtu)  26.4       
CO2 Price ($/ton)      4.0  3.2 
Cost of Coal ($/MMBtu)  1.95  2.02  1.95  1.95 
Cost of Gas ($/MMBtu)  5.42  5.45  5.40  5.35 
Change in Total Cost (B$/year)  1.4  4.9  0.5  2.6 
Consumer Cost  1.9  7.0  -0.9  3.4 
Producer Cost   -0.4  -2.3  1.4  1.5 
Cost to Government   -0.2  0.2  -0.1  -2.3 
Change in Cost / MWh ($/MWh)  1.9  5.8  0.4  3.2 
  2.8%  8.4%  0.7%  4.7% 
1) CO2 emissions reductions across the electricity sector are 141 million tons from baseline, or 5.4%. 
2) Change in total generation and capacity include changes in addition to coal and gas plants. 
3) Cost of efficiency improvements include investments in capital and changes operating proceedures. 
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Table 3. Regional Price Changes 
Year 2020  










RGGI  -0.40  4.75  -2.28  -0.54 
Rockies & West  2.69  3.22  -0.42  1.10 
Big 10 & Appalachia  -0.25  4.10  -0.25  1.71 
Southeast  -0.38  -0.41  0.44  1.93 
Plains  5.03  4.53  0.00  2.20 
Wholesale Competition  0.12  4.61  -1.53  0.90 
Cost of Service  1.79  1.75  0.52  1.92 
National  1.16  2.84  -0.25  1.54 
 
5.2  Generation and Capacity 
Changes in generation mirror changes in electricity price. The greatest decline occurs 
under the inflexible standard, which is 50 percent greater than the decline under cap and trade 
with an auction, and 85 percent greater than the decline under a flexible standard. There is almost 
no change in generation under cap and trade with allocation to LDCs.  
The decline in coal generation is 83 percent greater under the inflexible standard than 
under the flexible one, and the difference is proportional to the change in overall generation. 
Under both policies there is an increase in gas-fired generation that offsets 63 percent (for the 
inflexible standard) and 69 percent (for the flexible standard) of the decline in coal generation.  
However the relative change in generation by fuel type is not proportional when 
comparing to the cap and trade policies. The decline in coal-fired generation is roughly one-third 
of what obtains under the flexible standard, and much smaller still compared to the inflexible 
standard. Conversely, the increase in natural gas generation is much smaller also. The reason is 
related to the change in capacity. 
The change in coal-fired capacity is the greatest under the inflexible standard, and is six 
times greater than occurs under the flexible standard and roughly 8 times greater than occurs 
under the cap and trade policies. The capacity change is relatively greater than the generation 
change from coal-fired plants because the inflexible standard forces retirement from capacity that Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Paul, and Woerman 
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does not generate very much. To varying degrees, there is an offsetting increase in natural gas 
capacity and a much smaller increase in renewable generation capacity (not shown in Table 2).  
The pattern of retirements varies substantially between the flexible (darker bars) and 
inflexible (lighter bars) standards, as illustrated in Figure 1. The horizontal axis displays heat 
rates in the data year (2008) before any investments have taken place, and the vertical axis 
displays incremental capacity retirements that occur in addition to those that occur in the baseline 
under each policy. The vertical dashed lines represent the benchmarks under the flexible standard 
(darker line on the left) and the inflexible standard (lighter line on the right). Reading from the 
left, one sees that there is less retirement among the relatively efficient units under both policies 
than occurs under the baseline. This occurs because electricity price increases under both 
policies, providing greater revenue and increasing going-forward profitability.  
At about 10,400 Btu/kWh, one begins to observe net retirements under the flexible 
standard but not under the inflexible standard. In this range the profitability due to the greater 
change in electricity price under the inflexible standard is influential, and plants that don’t have 
to retire do not do so. Under the flexible standard the cost of GECOs for plants operating at a 
heat rate that is greater than the benchmark of 9,657 Btu/kWh also is influential in promoting 
greater retirement. At 11,000 Btu/kWh important levels of retirement begin under the inflexible 
standard as it becomes increasingly difficult for these plants to attain the standard. All plants 
with an initial heat rate greater than approximately 11,000 Btu/kWh will necessarily retire 
because they do not have the technical opportunity to achieve the standard.  
5.3  Investments 
Table 2 reports the average heat rate that is obtained under the various policies. The 
lowest heat rate is obtained under the flexible policy because even relatively efficient plants 
retain a strong incentive to reduce heat rates where there are opportunities to do so. In contrast, 
under the inflexible standard if a plant is in attainment of the standard its incentives to make 
additional investments are relatively weak and largely equivalent to those that occur under the 
baseline. The cap and trade policies result in the greatest heat rates and the least improvement in 
average efficiency because these policies do not target this specific margin of performance, but 
instead harvest emissions reductions from many channels. Recall the emissions reductions 
required under the two cap-and-trade policies is applied to the entire electricity sector, so 
substitution from coal to natural gas generation plays a major role in these cases. As a 
consequence, although the cap and trade approaches would be expected to be more efficient 
overall, they are less effective at achieving improvements in plant performance.  Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Paul, and Woerman 
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Figure 1. Incremental Capacity Retirements in 2020 by Heat Rate 
 
The flexible standard yields investments of $2,933 million in energy efficiency, over 8 
times more than under the inflexible standard by 2020. The GECO price begins to climb sharply 
at that point, jumping from $4.80/Btu in 2018 to $26.4/Btu in 2020. This jump occurs because at 
that juncture 95 percent of potential efficiency improvements have been made. 
5.4  Costs 
With the exception of the inflexible standard, three of the policies generate prices 
associated with new assets. Cap and trade policies introduce tradable emissions allowances and 
the flexible performance standard yields a price on generation efficiency credit offsets (GECOs) 
equal to $26.4/MMBtu in 2020.  
In 2020 the benchmark level under the flexible standard is 9,657 Btu/kWh. Plants that are 







































































































































































































































Flexible InflexibleResources for the Future  Burtraw, Paul, and Woerman 
20 
decisions of individual plants about investment in energy efficiency and their level of continued 
operation will vary depending on regional differences in fuel costs and the cost of allowances for 
other pollutants (sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides), electricity prices and equilibrium changes 
in capacity and generation. To consider a representative example, consider a plant that has a heat 
rate of 10,000 Btu/kWh in the baseline but makes investments under the flexible policy to reduce 
its heat rate to 9,600 Btu/kWh. Then for every kWh it generates it earns 9,657 GECOs (equal to 
the benchmark) but has to surrender only 9,600 GECOs for compliance. In other words, this 
relatively efficient plant earns 57 GECOs on net for each kWh of operation, and at the 
equilibrium GECO price of $26.4/MMBtu, this totals to $1.5 per MWh
16 as a reward for 
relatively efficient operation. In contrast, consider a plant that starts out with a heat rate of 
10,500 Btu/kWh in the baseline and under the flexible policy chooses to make investments to 
reduce its heat rate to 10,000 Btu/kWh. At the benchmark of 9,657 Btu/kWh this plant must 
purchase 343 GECOs for every kWh of operation. The total GECO cost for this plant is $9.1 per 
MWh, which serves a penalty for relatively inefficient operation. 
Even in the baseline, firms already have an incentive to save on fuel costs, so it may be 
surprising that a flexible performance standard would be able to engender substantial additional 
improvements in efficiency beyond those that would already occur. The flexible standard does so 
because it introduces a potent signal at the margin that is substantially greater than the marginal 
signal to improve efficiency associated with fuel costs. At a GECO price of $26.4/Btu, the 
marginal incentive to improve efficiency is approximately 13 times greater from the flexible 
standard than is the signal from fuel cost savings alone, and this incentive applies to relatively 
efficient facilities as well as inefficient ones. 
Nonetheless, for a relatively inefficient facility the GECO costs can accumulate to a 
substantial amount. At a heat rate of 10,400 Btu/kWh a facility will incur GECO costs that are 
about equal in magnitude to its total fuel costs, and at a rate of 11,300 Btu/kWh it will incur costs 
that are two times greater than its total fuel costs, even after it may have incurred costs to make 
efficiency investments. From the perspective of the plant operator, these additional costs may 
seem exceptional, and may be viewed as a disadvantage compared to an inflexible standard that 
would not incur GECO costs. However, from a system perspective the flexible standard has an 
                                                 
16 Each GECO measures a difference in heat rate, so GECOs are in units of Btu/kWh. The net GECO generation of 
a plant can be multiplied by the GECO price (in $/Btu) to yield a net subsidy or cost per kWh of generation. In this 
example, 57 Btu/kWh * $2.64*10
-5/Btu = $0.0015/kWh, which is equivalent to $1.5/MWh. Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Paul, and Woerman 
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advantage that it would allow a plant with heat rates of 11,300 Btu/kWh to remain in operation if 
it chose to do so, even after considering the incremental GECO-related costs. Such a facility 
might remain in service because of its idiosyncratic value to the electricity grid, which may 
depend on its unique location or type of ancillary service it provides. An inflexible standard 
would not allow such a facility to survive, despite its great value, because it strictly violates the 
allowable level of performance. 
The average equilibrium delivered cost of coal varies only under the inflexible standard. 
This outcome results from a change in the type of coal used. The substantial retirement of 
relatively inefficient facilities lowers the demand for emissions allowances and also their price, 
leading to a substitution to greater use of bituminous coal and away from low-sulfur 
subbituminous coal. The geographic distribution of surviving facilities also contributes to the 
increase in the average delivered cost of coal. The national average equilibrium delivered cost of 
natural gas closely mirrors the change in generation with natural gas. 
5.5  Cost Effectiveness   
Total cost (billion dollars per year) of the policies is decomposed into changes in 
consumer expenditures, producer surplus and revenues to the government. Table 2 shows the 
change in each cost category under each policy before adjusting for changes in the level of 
consumption. The change in consumer cost is the change in total expenditure on electricity. The 
change in producer cost is the change in producer surplus (profits). The costs of the policy are 
either passed on to consumers or absorbed in a change in producer profits. To this we add the 
change in costs to government. To calculate cost effectiveness, we first find the total cost of 
generating electricity in each policy and then divide this cost by the total amount of electricity 
consumed. This gives the average cost of a MWh of consumed electricity under each policy. 
This cost is compared to the cost in the baseline scenario, and the additional per-MWh cost of 
each policy is reported in Table 2. 
The largest change in consumer costs is an increase of $7 billion per year that occurs 
under the inflexible standard, due to the increase in electricity prices. The cap and trade policy 
with allocation to LDCs reduces consumer costs due to declining electricity prices, while the 
other policies increase electricity prices and consequently increase consumer costs. The largest 
change in producer cost is a decline in cost (increase in profits) of $2.3 billion per year also 
under the inflexible standard. This change is driven by the change in retail electricity prices; 
however, the benefit of the price change accrues to the industry as a whole and does not signal an 
increase in profits from owners of coal-fired plants. The industry also realizes a negative cost Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Paul, and Woerman 
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under the flexible standard, but it is much less than in the inflexible case. In contrast the cap and 
trade policies lead to increases in producer costs. The changes in government costs are negative 
and large due to revenues from the auction in one case and include small changes in tax revenues 
otherwise. 
Our measure of cost effectiveness is the change in the average per-MWh cost of 
electricity ($/MWh), noting that the emissions reductions are constant across the policies, The 
inflexible standard results in a percent change in industry costs per MWh of 8.4 percent from 
baseline, roughly three times as great as the increased cost under the flexible standard. The costs 
under the cap and trade with LDC allocation are lowest, but this measure masks costs that are 
imposed on other parts of the economy because of the higher allowance price that results 
compared to cap and trade with an auction.  
6   Conclusions 
This research investigates the economic opportunity and potential advantage of 
introducing flexibility in the CO2 emissions reduction activities and compliance responsibilities 
for stationary sources under the Clean Air Act. We model these emissions reductions activities as 
improvement in the operating efficiency (as opposed to the emissions rate) of coal-fired power 
plants. We compare four leading approaches to climate policy in the electricity sector using a 
detailed simulation model, where the primary mode of compliance is investment at plants to 
improve their operating performance. The policies we examine include a flexible performance 
standard that allowed trading among sources so that the standard was achieved in the aggregate 
and an inflexible standard that required every individual source to be in compliance. We 
compare these with two versions of cap and trade. All policies are calibrated to achieve equal 
emissions reductions. 
The flexible standard results in an increase of about 1.3 percent in electricity price 
compared to the baseline. In contrast, the change in electricity price under an inflexible standard 
is 3.3 percent of baseline levels, substantially more than would occur even under cap and trade 
with an auction. The inflexible standard also leads to the greatest decline in coal-fired generation, 
about 85 percent greater than would occur under a flexible standard. Conversely, the flexible 
standard leads to much greater investment to improve the operating efficiency of existing plants. 
These investments coupled with the flexibility of this approach explain the relative profitability 
of existing coal-plants under the flexible standard compared to an inflexible approach. The 
flexible standard leads to total cost that is just 29 percent of that under the inflexible approach. Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Paul, and Woerman 
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We also find the flexible policy affects decisions about the continued operation of 
individual plants. The flexible standard allows for continued operation of some relatively 
inefficient plants that have relatively high economic value within the electricity system, while the 
inflexible standard forces the retirement of those plants. 
One important caveat is that the EPA may propose and states may promulgate alternative 
policies that result in different emissions reductions for different categories of plants, rather than 
for all coal-fired units as we have modeled it. For example, subcategorization by unit type could 
lead to different results. 
Nonetheless, the EPA is expected to promulgate rules affecting existing stationary 
sources including coal fired power plants in 2012. Legal analysis indicates the agency has 
substantial authority to implement flexibility in compliance with these rules. This research 
indicates that under the performance standard design modeled here the economic advantages of 
this approach would be substantial, reducing the change in electricity prices by 60 percent while 
also reducing the total costs of the standards by over two-thirds compared to an inflexible 
standard. Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Paul, and Woerman 
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Appendix:  Emission Rate versus Heat Rate Standards 
One dimension that affects the design of performance standards are whether they should 
be based on emissions rates or heat rates. A percentage improvement in the average emissions 
rate is nearly equivalent to a percentage improvement in the average heat rate. The difference 
stems from slight variation in carbon per Btu in varieties of coals. However, a percentage 
improvement in the average emissions rate (or equivalently in the average heat rate) does not 
necessarily lead to an equal percentage reduction in total emissions. In fact, a policy that reduced 
the average emissions rate by 5 percent could reduce total emissions by much more than 5 
percent, depending on its effect on the generation and capacity mix.  
To illustrate, imagine a fleet of plants with heat rates of 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 (thousand 
Btu/kWh). If these plants all had equal utilization rates, and emissions were a straight-forward 
multiple (E) of heat rate and utilization, then in the baseline emissions equal 50E. Retirement of 
the least efficient plant (12) would drop the average heat rate from 10 to 9.5 (an improvement of 
5 percent) but it would reduce emissions to 38E (a reduction of 24 percent). Note further, this is 
not the same as an inflexible standard that required a 5 percent improvement in the heat rate of 
every plant, which would lead to a new average heat rate of 9.5, and emissions of 45E. 
Table A1 reports the changes that occur by using a flexible and inflexible standard to 
achieve equivalent average reductions in heat rate. The results for the flexible standard are the 
same as in Table 2; but in Table A1 the emissions changes differ between these two policies. The 
inflexible standard requiring an equivalent average heat rate leads to an emissions decrease that 
is 2.8 times greater, but an increase in electricity price 7.5 times greater. Substantially greater 
reductions in coal generation and capacity also result, along with large increases in the use of 
natural gas. The inflexible standard does not yield substantial investments in efficiency 
improvements at existing facilities. The total cost is over 8 times greater than the flexible 
standard. Divided by the change in CO2 emissions this reflects a change in industry costs per ton 
reduced that is 2.7 times that achieved under the flexible standard. 
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Table A1. Comparison of Scenarios Achieving Equal Average Heat Rate Improvement
1 
Year 2020  
Values in 2008 dollars 
Flexible 
Compliance  Inflexible Standard 
Change in Elec. Price ($/MWh)  1.16  7.07 
  1.3%  8.1% 
Change in Generation
2 (BkWh)  -40  -181 
  -0.9%  -4.1% 
Coal   -114  -619 
  -5.9%  -32.1% 
Gas   79  419 
  7.8%  41.7% 
Change in Capacity
2(GW)  -0.6  -17.5 
  -0.1%  -1.8% 
Coal  -5.5  -92.6 
  -2.0%  -33.7% 
Gas  6.2  73.3 
  1.5%  17.2% 
Avg. Coal Plant Heat Rate (Btu/kWh)  9,657  9,653 
Avg. Effic. Improve. (Btu/kWh)  525  529 
  5.2%  5.2% 
Efficiency Investments (M$)
3  2,933  418 
GECO Price ($/MMBtu)  26.4   
CO2 Price ($/ton)     
Cost of Coal ($/MMBtu)  1.95  1.96 
Cost of Gas ($/MMBtu)  5.42  5.79 
Change in Total Cost (B$/year)  1.4  11.4 
Consumer Cost  1.9  15.9 
Producer Cost   -0.4  -5.1 
Cost to Government   -0.2  0.6 
Change in Cost / MWh ($/MWh)  1.9  13.9 
  2.8%  20.1% 
Change CO2 Emissions (M tons)  141  400 
Change in Cost /MWh /ton ($/MWh/Mtons)  0.13  0.35 
1) CO2 emissions reductions across differ between these two scenarios. 
2) Change in total generation and capacity include changes in addition to coal and gas plants. 
3) Cost of efficiency improvements include investments in capital and changes operating proceedures. 
 